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Address by Vice Admiral Frank C. Pandolfe to the Naval Strategy Sym-
posium, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 13 June 2016
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN U.S. NAVAL 
STRATEGY
 Good morning, everyone. It’s a pleasure to be back in Newport, the home of naval strategic thought for well over a hundred years. Thanks to this 
school—and to the thousands of military officers and civilian strategists who 
have worked here over the years—our Navy has benefited from farsighted and 
rigorous thinking about how best to apply maritime power to achieve our nation’s 
goals in ever-changing security environments.
Today we sometimes hear laments about how our nation lacks effective mili-
tary strategies and strategists. Yet in this room today there are nearly seventy-five 
naval officers representing a vibrant community of strategic thinking that is 
growing every year. And when we include civilian members of our strategy com-
munity and retired officers, we can appreciate a family that numbers many more.
So, my first message to you today is to take heart regarding the state of our 
strategic thinking. It is robust, and I predict it will remain so. Why do I say that? 
Because our Navy has regularly produced timely and innovative strategies over 
the past thirty years. Let’s take a look.
Modern Naval Strategy: An Overview
Let’s start with the Maritime Strategy of 1986. I was a junior officer when it came 
out. I well remember the excitement generated by publication of that unclassified 
version of our war plan for taking the fight to the enemy at sea and ashore. In 
a confrontational era, it was a confrontational document. Inside its covers were 
three complementary essays by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], CMC 
[Commandant of the Marine Corps], and SecNav [Secretary of the Navy]. The 
Maritime Strategy focused on how we would defeat the Soviet fleet, detailed how 
the Marines would take the fight ashore, and called for six hundred ships to fulfill 
the strategy.
Critics said the Maritime Strategy was nothing more than a marketing tool to 
justify an expanded Navy and Marine Corps. They were wrong. The Maritime 
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Strategy galvanized the fleet. It provided a strategic context for developing 
war-fighting instructions and executing bold and innovative tactics that were 
practiced from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. 
Above all, it was a powerful signal from our leadership that maritime power 
would play a leading role should global war be unleashed on us.
The Maritime Strategy, like all strategies, had to make choices. Its horizon was 
relatively near term. Specifics of how the services would integrate capabilities 
largely were left for others to work out. And the fiscal challenges of sustaining 
such a large fleet were not fully addressed.
Nevertheless, the Maritime Strategy succeeded brilliantly in communicating 
the challenges we faced and our unalterable goal of victory at sea, to be achieved 
by the simultaneous application of decisive operations in multiple theaters. It 
called for action by way of an ambitious construction program that would create 
the instrument of supreme sea power in the late twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first. It was a strategy that dreamed big and, in doing so, generated strong 
support to build hundreds of ships, some of which still sail in the fleet today.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the naval services shifted gears 
and unveiled . . . From the Sea in 1992. Today it is easy to underestimate how 
much emotion went into writing that document. The world had fundamentally 
changed, and a new strategy was needed to address emergent challenges. To be 
effective, that strategy had to address hard choices, recommending that some 
capabilities be emphasized going forward and others downsized.
In the absence of the Soviet Union, American sea control was assumed as a 
fact; an open-ocean fight would not be necessary. Power projection ashore was 
king. Henceforth, naval forces would focus their efforts in the littorals, ensuring 
the flow ashore of military capabilities by way of sequential joint operations.
As a result of this shift in naval strategic thinking, a number of submarines and 
maritime patrol aircraft were cut from the fleet while strike assets and amphibi-
ous shipping were prioritized. Adversaries were viewed as regional in nature and 
with limited reach. Addressing humanitarian concerns emerged as a key mis-
sion area, rivaling war fighting in competing for institutional attention. Political 
theorists spoke of great-power convergence, working toward an increasingly free, 
prosperous, and peaceful world order. A terrible day in September 2001 ended 
such utopian dreams.
In October 2002, our Navy unveiled its Sea Power 21 strategy. Sea Power 21 
described the capabilities needed to meet nation-state challenges but also to ad-
dress growing transregional threats posed by substate actors employing terror to 
undermine established political orders.
Sea Power 21 emphasized the centrality of networked information in generat-
ing joint effects. It moved beyond the sequential prescriptions of . . . From the 
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Sea to envision a unified battle space within which the oceans would be a vast 
maneuver area from which to deliver offensive fires and—for the first time— 
defensive protection deep inland. It stated that in the future the positioning of 
BMD [ballistic-missile defense] ships would rival that of aircraft carriers, while 
computer network defenses would be as important as missiles in ensuring mis-
sion success. It directed radical change in how we managed the fleet, implement-
ed innovation, and trained our people.
Sea Power 21, like its predecessors, emphasized some things over others. It 
largely spoke to exploiting U.S. unilateral advantages, stressing the development 
of advanced capabilities that would widen the gap between America and its 
partners. If the heart of the Maritime Strategy was an operational war plan, Sea 
Power 21 fundamentally was a vision document. Both, to be fully implemented, 
required significant increases in naval funding.
Sea Power 21 served us well. It set the course for our Navy’s capability develop-
ment. Today, nearly fourteen years later, most of the programs it recommended 
are present or arriving in the fleet; we are implementing increasingly responsive, 
transparent, and tailored training and assignment processes; and we continue our 
efforts to capture institutional efficiencies.
In 2007, the naval services updated our strategic guidance yet again by un-
veiling A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. CS-21, as it became 
known, was a hopeful strategy. It emphasized the collective strength to be derived 
from leveraging a global coalition of like-minded nations. It foresaw the possibil-
ity of creating, in effect, a “thousand-ship navy” dedicated to patrolling the sea-
lanes, policing up international outliers, and providing humanitarian assistance 
and disaster response (HA/DR).
While the Maritime Strategy emphasized war fighting at sea, . . . From the Sea 
stressed enabling sequential joint power projection, and Sea Power 21 envisioned 
networked capabilities generating joint effects across a unified battle space, CS-
21 highlighted the value to our nation of time-tested maritime core capabilities: 
forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, 
HA/DR.
CS-21 proved right for its time, as well. It demonstrated immense international 
appeal owing to its inclusive nature and relatively modest capability demands. 
It was the perfect vehicle for rallying broad efforts to combat piracy, which had 
emerged as a significant problem for international commerce. It came to life as 
an array of navies from around the globe worked together to shepherd merchant 
ships through dangerous waters. And it fostered navy-to-navy cooperation in 
other ways. For example, at various times both Russian and Chinese senior of-
ficers attended the International Seapower Symposium in Newport.
NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb   9 9/15/16   12:47 PM
3
Pandolfe: The Evolution of Modern U.S. Naval Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
CS-21 also had its critics. It struck some as overly optimistic in implying that 
growing economic integration would lead to political convergence. It also was 
accused of de-emphasizing war fighting. But such issues did not compromise its 
effectiveness. In the end, CS-21 was remarkably successful in inspiring greater 
international naval cooperation.
More recently, as international tensions have increased from the Baltic to the 
South China Sea, our strategy has been revised yet again. Introduced just last 
year, CS-21 Revised (2015) has a sharper edge than its predecessor. It emphasizes 
five essential functions, the first of which is all-domain access to counter grow-
ing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, followed by deterrence, sea control, 
power projection, and maritime security. The previous emphasis on coalition 
efforts is balanced with the need to develop higher-end war-fighting capabilities. 
HA/DR is dropped as a major focus area. Russia and China are named as growing 
sources of international instability. CNO [Admiral John] Richardson underlines 
this evolving challenge in his Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, writ-
ing that “[f]or the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to 
great power competition.”
Lessons Learned
What lessons can we take away from this brief review of the evolution of naval 
strategy over the past three decades?
First, naval strategic thinking is not on holiday today and never has been. To 
the contrary, the naval services have compiled an impressive record of updating 
their strategic guidance documents on a regular basis to reflect an ever-changing 
world.
Also, all these documents emphasized time-tested maritime strengths, includ-
ing the importance of being forward to reassure allies, deter adversaries, and 
respond to crises. They prescribed the application of both sea-control and power-
projection capabilities, adjusting the balance between them to reflect the prevail-
ing threat environment. And they conveyed an appreciation for the importance 
of allies and partners while illuminating the need to develop and, when necessary, 
to employ unilateral capabilities. They built on one another—they evolved—in 
recommending actions required to meet changing threats. And they conveyed an 
appreciation for the importance of teamwork within and among services, depart-
ments, agencies, and nations.
Yet each of these documents was distinct in how it emphasized the three pillars 
of strategy: ends, ways, and means. For example, Sea Power 21’s strength was its 
vision of a future fleet, illustrating the ends of strategy. The Maritime Strategy of 
1986, on the other hand, was most effective in detailing how the United States 
would destroy the Soviet fleet and project power ashore, a brilliant illustration of 
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strategic ways. And CS-21 was unique in emphasizing the power of partnering, 
placing an emphasis on employing shared means toward common purpose.
As times changed, so did our strategic guidance. Yet when looking across these 
documents, are there lessons to be learned? I believe there are. In drafting future 
strategies, I recommend employing the following principles:
1. Address the main challenge. A successful strategy must focus on the most 
pressing challenge facing our Navy at the time. Defeat the Soviets, enable 
joint operations ashore, envision the future, leverage cooperative action—
each naval strategy in its own way addressed the most immediate need 
before us.
2. Call for action. An effective strategy must inspire change. The Maritime 
Strategy galvanized support to build a six-hundred-ship Navy. . . . From 
the Sea led to tough choices that had far-reaching impact. Sea Power 21 
called for leveraging networked information to improve everything from 
war fighting to personnel processes. And CS-21 recommended building 
innovative coalitions to generate presence beyond the capacity of any one 
navy.
3. Feasibility first. To be effective, a strategy must be achievable. When 
debating strategic options, the first question to be asked should be “Can 
we do this?” rather than “Should we do this?” Clausewitz wrote that if the 
ends of a strategy are beyond its means before the start of conflict, they 
likely will remain so. Shaping ends to match ways and means is central to 
developing a solid strategy. Only after the strategy is properly scoped may 
decision makers answer the policy question: Should we do this?
4. Keep it short. American strategy during World War II remains the gold 
standard for succinctness: Germany first. Two words. That’s it. Those two 
words conveyed the end state we were pursuing, the sequence of major 
operations, the priority of resourcing and logistics, and the order by 
which we would begin to rebuild the badly fractured structure of world 
order. When writing a strategy, plain English is best, keep it unclassified if 
possible, and be ready to answer concisely the first question always asked: 
What’s new here?
5. Communicate, communicate, communicate. For any strategy to be 
effective, it must be driven home by way of a robust communication plan: 
many voices singing one song. Never underestimate how difficult it will 
be to penetrate target audiences with a clear message. Today that is harder 
than ever before because there is so much competition in the information 
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space. Everyone is wired, attention spans are short, and there is endless 
hype out there to steer attention away from your message.
6. Be generous. No strategy is “all new.” Each of the strategies reviewed here 
built on its predecessors while introducing fresh thoughts. In writing your 
contribution, I urge you to consult with those who came before you. At 
the end of the day, you will want your fellow strategists supporting your 
efforts.
What does all that amount to in practice? It means this: the most impactful 
strategies drive change—they cast the line far out in the water, seeking big fish; 
the best strategies are feasible and tightly written; the most effective strategies are 
hammered home relentlessly; and the best supported strategies leverage the col-
lective wisdom of our strategy family.
All Ahead Flank!
So, where do we go from here? For naval strategists today, there are many rich 
areas to explore. In writing the next strategy, here are some questions to consider: 
• What is the key challenge facing our Navy today? Where do we most need 
fresh guidance?
• Should we more strongly emphasize sea control, given the rise of A2/AD 
threats? Should we go even further and invest more fully in sea-denial  
capabilities?
• Should nonkinetic effects become our primary area of focus? Given the num-
ber of incoming threats we are likely to face, is it time to rely more heavily on 
nonkinetic effects?
• Should we concentrate the fleet in one region? Is that even possible, given 
today’s transregional threats?
• Should we focus on restoring readiness by reducing forward presence, or 
would doing so invite aggression and drive up demand?
• Should we shift funding among communities? We did so effectively to ad-
dress the challenges of the post–Cold War era. Is it time to do so again, to 
counter the threats of a globalized era?
• Should we emphasize the value of partners to the degree that we have in 
recent strategy documents? Or is it time, once again, to focus primarily on 
advancing American capabilities?
Those are just a few of the many vital questions to ponder as you begin writing 
the next chapter in our strategic story. I urge you to explore them fully. I hope 
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you will fire up impassioned debates about the future of our Navy, ultimately 
positioning it to keep our nation safe and to shape the world to be a better place. 
That is your challenge, and I wish you every success on your journey!
Thank you.
VICE ADMIRAL FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN
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